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Abstract 
This study evaluated the reliability and validity of the Triage Assessment Survey: 
Organizations (TAS:O), a 27-item, 5-point, Likert summated rating scale.  The 
participants consisted of 117 graduate students.  All participants responded to the 
TAS:O after reading mild, moderate, marked and severe organizational crisis 
scenarios.  Statistical analyses were performed on the data to determine the 
instrument’s reliability and validity.  The overall Cronbach’s alpha and Spearman-
Brown reliability tests were both .93.  An item total correlation revealed that all but 
one item had statistically significant correlations.  Factor analysis revealed three 
factors, confirming the hypothesis that the TAS:O is comprised of three distinct 
factors (Affect, Behavior, and Cognition).  However, with .50 used as a cutoff level 
for factor loadings, 6 of the 27 items did not load onto any factor.  An ANOVA 
revealed that the TAS:O has the capacity to distinguish among mild, moderate, 
marked, and severe crises.  Thus, overall statistical analyses revealed that the TAS:O 
appears to be a reliable and valid measure of individual responses to organizational 
crises.  Because this is the first study to evaluate the TAS:O, further studies are 
needed to strengthen confidence in the psychometric properties of this scale.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the aftermath of the event known as 9/11, conflict that has stretched 
worldwide, and impending terrorist attacks, the word crisis has become prevalent 
around the world.  A crisis is a perception of an event as an unbearable difficulty that 
exceeds a person’s immediate resources and coping mechanisms (James & Gilliland, 
2001; Myer, 2001).  Because crises are perceptions of events rather than events 
themselves, what constitutes a crisis differs from person to person (Aguilera, 1998; 
James & Gilliland; Myer).  A universal feature of crises is that given the right 
constellation of circumstances, no individual can be immune to them (James & 
Gilliland).  In other words, all people are susceptible to experiencing a crisis.   
Whereas definitions of a crisis for individuals abound, a review of the 
literature revealed no commonly held definition for an organizational crisis.  Though 
Pearson & Clair (1998) offered a definition of organizational crisis, some viable 
questions need to be raised about their definition.  Pearson & Clair define 
organizational crisis as a low-probability, high-impact incident that threatens the 
viability of the organization and is distinguished by uncertainty of cause, effect, and 
means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made quickly.  What 
prevents this definition from being a universally acceptable definition is it makes the 
assumption that an event with a certain cause, course of action and/or means of 
resolution cannot constitute a crisis.  In other words, by defining organizational crisis 
this way, events with known causes (i.e., earthquakes), events that produce specific 
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effects (i.e., having to move production from one center to another), and events that 
have certain means of resolution (i.e., well-thought out crisis management plans), do 
not constitute crises.  Furthermore, this definition does not include people’s 
perceptions of what is occurring in their organizations, which contrasts how other 
authors (e.g., Barton, 2001; Fink, 2002; Laye, 2002; Mitroff, 2004; Mitroff & 
Anagnos, 2001; Mitroff et al., 1996; Parsons, 1996; Shrivastava, 1993) use perception 
in their descriptions of organizational crises.     
In many cases, authors in the field of organizational crises do not provide a 
specific definition of an organizational crisis.  Rather than providing a specific 
definition of an organizational crisis, authors (e.g., Barton, 2001; Fink, 2002; Laye, 
2002; Mitroff, 2004; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Mitroff et al., 1996; Parsons, 1996; 
Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Shrivastava, 1993) tend to describe examples, 
characteristics, and effects of organizational crises.  For example, many books (e.g., 
Barton; Fink; Mitroff; Mitroff & Anagnos; Mitroff et al.; Pauchant & Mitroff) begin 
by describing previous crises and how organizations handled them.  Some 
characteristics of organizational crises are that they affect organizations in either 
positive or negative ways (Fink), and mark turning points that can affect all, or part of 
an organization (Mitroff et al.).  Mitroff et al. noted that organizational crises occur in 
phases, and produce effects in which systems, mechanisms and stakeholders are all 
affected.  Whereas this information describes examples and components of 
organizational crises, these components of organizational crises lack the universality 
needed for an effective definition of organizational crises.        
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Three primary reasons can be deduced from the literature to explain the lack 
of a universally accepted definition of an organizational crisis.  First, regardless of the 
phenomena acting on an organization, perception defines the view of the phenomena.  
Secondly, scholars in the field of organizational crises tend to take a multidisciplinary 
approach (Pearson & Clair, 1998) and hence, a widespread view of the same topic is 
created (Shrivastava, 1993).  Thirdly, organizational crises can be generated either 
externally or internally, and affect one part, or all of an organization (Mitroff et al., 
1996).  For example, an event perceived as a crisis by some members of an 
organization can be viewed as an opportunity for other members of the same 
organization.  However, regardless of the lack of specificity in defining 
organizational crisis, a definition of organizational crisis can be adapted from the 
literature: an organizational crisis is an experience of an event that alters the 
homeostasis of the organization, disrupting the organization’s routine functioning.   
Literature overwhelmingly supports that organizational crises are inevitable 
(e.g., Fink, 2002; Laye, 2002; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Parsons, 1996; Shonfeld, 
Lichtenstein, Kline Pruett, & Speese-Linehan, 2002; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  
Crises can happen at any time or place to any company (Fink).  The conclusion that 
organizational crises are inevitable stems from countless examples of all types of 
organizations.  From workplace violence to terrorism, from layoffs to mergers, crises 
have permeated the workforce as long as the workforce has existed.          
Crises provide challenges to organizations because by their very nature, crises 
disrupt the existing homeostasis (Burgess & Baldwin, 1981).  Crises affect human 
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beings in significant ways and, because people are the foundation of organizations 
(Viola, 1977), almost any disruption of homeostasis can have a profound effect on the 
organization as a whole.  Whereas it has been noted that organizations’ responses to 
crises often determine the future of those organizations (Braverman, 1999; Mitroff & 
Anagnos, 2001), it has also been noted that organizations’ responses to crises are 
often determined by their preparedness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).    
 Fink (2002) noted that in recent history, as many as three-fourths of the 
Fortune 500 companies have experienced what they would consider a serious crisis.  
Determining the number of organizations that have suffered a crisis in any given year 
is impossible since no central reporting location exists.  Nonetheless, Fink suggested 
that every organization can expect to have at least one crisis every four or five years.  
Existing data does, however, indicate that organizations that respond well to crises 
(meaning those who return their organization to a state of equilibrium) experience 
recovery, whereas those who do not respond well to crises tend to experience decline 
(Blythe, 2003).  For example, Blythe (2003) found that when organizations responded 
well to crises, they had a 22% higher stock price than those who did not respond well.  
Therefore, it is in the best economic interest of organizations to respond well to 
crises. 
 An abundance of literature has recently focused on how organizations prepare 
for crises (e.g., Braverman, 1999; Fink, 2002; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Mitroff, 
Pearson, & Harrington, 1996; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Shonfeld et al., 2002).  
Some studies have indicated that organizations that are not prepared for crises are, in 
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fact, crisis-prone (Pauchant & Mitroff).  Crisis-prone organizations tend to not 
address the areas that make themselves more susceptible to crises (Pauchant & 
Mitroff).  In fact, organizations that choose not to be crisis-prepared tend to expend 
more financially than prepared organizations (Mitroff et al., 1996; Pauchant & 
Mitroff).  Greater financial burdens and disruption of organizational homeostasis can 
be accrued through rebuilding costs, production decline, frequent consulting fees, 
higher turnover rates and managerial changes (Mitroff & Anagnos; Mitroff et al.; 
Pauchant & Mitroff).  Therefore, crisis preparation is crucial for organizations 
because it diminishes the disruption of homeostasis caused by crises (Braverman; 
Mitroff & Anagnos; Pauchant & Mitroff), and makes better financial sense.   
 Historically, organizations have used two types of crisis preparation: risk 
assessment and business impact analysis (Laye, 2002; Mitroff et al., 1996; Paton, 
Smith, & Violanti, 2000).  Organizations use risk assessment to understand the type 
of threats that might occur and the acceptability of the predictable outcomes (Laye; 
Paton et al., 2000).  In contrast, organizations use business impact analysis to evaluate 
the ruin that may be caused by crises (Laye).  More specifically, risk assessment 
entails assessing organizations’ vulnerability or weaknesses, whereas business impact 
analysis entails assessing the damage that can be caused by crises.  A simple way to 
state this is, “Where are our weak spots?” (risk assessment) versus, “What might 
happen if we experience damage here?” (business impact analysis).  Yet, regardless 
of the level of preparation, organizations inevitably encounter disruptions of some 
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kind (Blythe, 2003; Braverman, 1999; Fink, 2002; Mitroff et al.; Pauchant & Mitroff, 
1992; Shonfeld et al., 2002).   
 Regardless of their level of preparedness, organizations will encounter crises.  
The primary goal for crisis-struck organizations needs to be handling the crisis in a 
manner that restores organizational homeostasis (Mitroff & Anagnos).  The necessary 
first step for addressing crises is assessment (Braverman; James & Gilland, 2001; 
Laye, 2002; Mitroff & Anagnos; Mitroff et al.; Myer, 2001).  In the same way that 
assessment is generally regarded as an indispensable tool for understanding human 
behavior (Maxmen & Ward, 1995), post-crisis organizational assessment is essential 
for organizations to understand how they might recover from a crisis effectively 
(Levinson, 2002).  
 Organizations, like individuals, need a model to guide their assessment 
process (Myer & Conte, 2004).  Currently, few different models of organizational 
assessment can be found (e.g., Brown, Pryzwansky, & Schulte, 2001; Fink, 2002; 
Levinson, 2002).  Unfortunately, little emphasis is placed on assessing organizations 
after crises have occurred.  Even though literature exists that describes organizational 
assessment models that explain what type of data to collect (e.g., Brown et al.; Fink; 
Levinson), no literature describes specific post-crisis organizational assessment tools.   
Information extant organizational assessment models describe appears to 
leave out how the human impact of crises is assessed.  For example, Mitroff et al. 
(1996) noted that organizations should be assessed based on 4 major factors: (a) 
types, (b) phases, (c) systems, and (d) stakeholders.  Though this model describes 
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systems and stakeholders, it does not account for individual types of reactions.  
Brown et al. (2001) suggested a model of organizational assessment that includes 4 
types of data collection: (a) genetic data, (b) current descriptive data, (c) process data, 
and (d) interpretive data.  The specialized assessment model (Braverman, 1999) 
describes a general approach to assessment that involves organizations using a team 
approach to solve crisis situations heuristically.  Conversely, Adlerian and Behavioral 
models of organizational assessment are meticulously structured and based on 
algorithims (Brown et al.).  Unfortunately, a common aspect of these models of 
organizational assessment is that the human impact of crises is often overlooked.  
Assessing the totality of an organizational crisis means including 
understanding the effect the crisis had on the organizational members (Blake & 
Mouton, 1961).  People are the cornerstones of organizations (Moorhead & Griffin, 
1989; Viola, 1977); subsequently, people should not be forgotten in times of crisis.  
Organizations actually react the same way human beings do to crises (Weaver, 1988).  
More specifically, Pearson & Clair (1998) suggested that organizations, like 
individuals, react affectively, behaviorally, and cognitively to crises.  In fact, the 
concept of organizations reacting affectively, behaviorally, and cognitively to crises is 
the crux of the present study.   
Myer and Conte (2004) hypothesized specific ways organizations react 
affectively, behaviorally, and cognitively.  For example, organizations responding 
affectively to crises may be experiencing difficulty with morale.  Organizations 
experiencing disrupted meeting agendas would be responding behaviorally to crises; 
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while organizations responding cognitively to crises would be experiencing problems 
with decision-making.  The conclusion Myer and Conte drew from hypothesizing that 
organizations demonstrate specific affective, behavioral, and cognitive reactions, is 
that accurate organizational assessment must include individuals’ perceptions of their 
organization’s affective, behavioral and cognitive reactions to crises.     
A model that assesses affective, behavioral and cognitive responses to crises is 
the Triage Assessment Model (TAM) (Myer, Williams, Ottens, & Schimdt, 1992).  
Paton et al. (2000) noted that the best way to assess an organizational crisis is on a 
human level, and the TAM does this by addressing individual reactions.  However, 
Paton et al. also noted that power exists in evaluating the aggregate score of a group 
of people.  In other words, the most effective way to gather post-crisis assessments of 
an organization is to sample individuals’ perceptions of how their organization is 
handling the extant crisis.  It is from this context that Myer (2002) developed the 
Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations (TAS:O), an instrument that was designed 
to sample individuals’ perceptions of their organization’s affective, behavioral and 
cognitive responses to crises. 
Statement of the Problem 
 Whereas a bevy of organizational literature centers on crisis preparation (e.g., 
Braverman, 1999; Fink, 2002; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001; Mitroff et al., 1996; 
Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Shonfeld et al., 2002), little is offered that describes what 
organizations should assess after the crisis has occurred.  In fact, literature suggests 
that many organizations have a history of not assessing themselves well after a crisis 
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(e.g., Braverman; Fink; Mitroff & Anagnos; Mitroff et al; Pauchant & Mitroff; 
Shonfeld et al.).  The organizational assessment models that exist offer general 
assessment guidelines (Brown et al., 2001), but fail to assess the collective human 
impact of crises.  Thus, this study was performed to enhance organizational 
assessment, specifically addressing the collective human impact of crises by sampling 
individuals’ perceptions of how their organizations are responding to crises.   
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this research was to analyze the structure of the Triage 
Assessment Survey: Organizations (TAS:O), developed by Myer (2002).  
Specifically, construct validity of the TAS:O was evaluated using confirmatory factor 
analysis.  Reliability was tested using an internal consistency model.  In addition, this 
research analyzed the capacity of the TAS:O to distinguish among mild, moderate, 
marked and severe reactions of organizations to crises.   
Rationale 
Viola (1977) judged the failure to address the impact of crises on humans in 
an organization as a disconcerting practice.  By ignoring the effects of crises on their 
workers, organizations do a great injustice to their members and affiliates 
(Braverman, 1999; Williams, 1978).  The first step in addressing the human impact of 
crises is to assess how people have been affected by the particular crisis at hand 
(Levinson, 2002; Maxmen & Ward, 1995; Myer et al., 1992; Myer, 2001).  Still, a 
review of the literature revealed no concise organizational assessment tool that 
measures the impact crises have on organizational workers.  Specifically, no 
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organizational assessment tool was found that measures the affective, behavioral, and 
cognitive reactions of organizations after a crisis.  Filling this void is the point of 
departure for the current study. Although not all crises are similarly traumatic, 
varying degrees of trauma can still reduce the capacity of individuals to fulfill their 
duties and advance the cause of the organization for which they work.   
Significance of the Study 
Most organizations tend not to think about being prepared for a crisis (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2001), and that lack of forethought ultimately causes problems with 
productivity (Mitroff et al., 1996; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).  Along with a decrease 
in productivity, Greenstone & Leviton (2002) noted that when organizations 
experience a crisis, high stress levels become commonplace, absenteeism rises, 
teamwork dwindles, and very often, high turnover occurs.  Successfully assessing 
organizational members’ reactions to a crisis, (or handling the human impact of a 
crisis), is an essential first step to curtail organizational turmoil and decline 
(Levinson, 2002).   
Myer (2002) developed an assessment tool that measures organizational 
reactions to crises.  By determining the reliability and validity of this instrument, this 
research will add to the field of crisis intervention by putting researchers and scholars 
a step closer to understanding organizational reactions to crises.  More specifically, 
this research has been performed to help organizations to know if the TAS:O can be 
used to determine organizational affective, behavioral and cognitive reactions to 
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crises.  This pragmatic research adds to the literature of crisis intervention by 
facilitating organizational assessment of the human impact of organizational crises.  
Limitations 
 Limitations are restrictions on a study over which a researcher has no control 
(Rudestam & Newton, 2001).  Three foreseeable threats to external validity exist for 
this study that may limit the ability of the results to be generalized (Houser, 1998).  
The Hawthorne Effect, the novelty effect, and disruption effect could possibly 
threaten external validity (Houser).  The Hawthorne Effect occurs when people are 
aware that they are participating in a research experiment (Houser).  Specifically, the 
Hawthorne Effect means that participants may alter their answers because they know 
that they are being observed (Houser).  Novelty effects occur when any dependent 
measure gains are a result of being exposed to something that is new (i.e., the 
independent variable), rather than the actual effects of the treatment (Houser).  
Disruption effects occur when an unexpected disruption occurs during the experiment 
(Houser).  While the Hawthorne, novelty and disruption effects are similar, they 
diverge in that in the Hawthorne Effect, participants actively attempt to alter the 
outcome, while the novelty and disruption effects are more like experiencing a new 
gadget, in that attention is diverted (Houser).          
 Delimitations are limitations on studies that researchers impose (Rudestam & 
Newton, 2001).  A delimitation for this study occurs because participants will be 
responding to hypothetical scenarios rather than actual organizational crises.  
Therefore, a discrepancy may arise between the participants of this research 
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(responding to artificial crises) and organizational members’ responses to actual 
crises.  While a participant may respond to behavioral questions on the TAS:O in one 
way, there can be no accounting for the extraneous variable of social influence.  For 
example, responses to number 27, “People have to do other people’s jobs” may be 
altered by individual reactions to the crisis.  Whereas participants may mark that they 
do not believe that people will have to do other people’s jobs, in actuality, that may 
not be the case.  In other words, just because individuals indicate that they will act a 
certain way in a crisis situation does not mean that they will.  Thus, the use of 
hypothetical scenarios is a delimitation for this study.  
The rationale for imposing this delimitation on the study is that by using case 
scenarios, participants will not themselves be victims of a crisis.  Serious implications 
and ethical constraints exist in performing field studies on highly emotionally 
individuals.  Therefore, to perform an ethical study with the best interests of the 
participants involved, case scenarios were used.  However, because this research took 
place in a laboratory, it is likely to have lower external validity than if the study took 
place as a field experiment.  Thus, the laboratory setting itself also becomes a 
delimitation for this study.     
Definitions 
Organization – The entire personnel of a business. 
Organizational crisis - An experience of an event that alters the homeostasis of the 
organization, disrupting the organization’s routine functioning.   
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Mild reaction – In regard to the TAS:O, a response to a crisis that indicates the need 
for minimal and indirect crisis intervention. 
Moderate reaction – In regard to the TAS:O, a response to a crisis that indicates the 
need for reasonable and collaborative crisis intervention. 
Marked reaction – In regard to the TAS:O, a response to a crisis that indicates the 
need for more direct crisis intervention. 
Severe reaction – In regard to the TAS:O, a response by to a crisis that indicates the 
need for rigorous and direct crisis intervention.     
 
Summary 
Crises are inevitable for organizations, and the way an organization prepares for a 
crisis often determines how that organization will respond to the crisis.  Having an 
effective assessment process is integral for an organization to handle a crisis.  Myer 
(2002) developed an instrument (Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations) that 
appears to assess organizations’ affective, behavioral and cognitive reactions to 
crises.  The present study was designed to test the reliability and validity of the 
TAS:O.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the tragic event known worldwide as 9/11, the subject of organizational crises 
has become a rapidly expanding field.  The importance of understanding the effects of 
crises on organizations has gained a new immediacy.  This research was performed to 
add to the literature of organizational crisis management.  Specifically, the purpose of 
this research was to analyze the structure of the Triage Assessment Survey: 
Organizations (TAS:O), developed by Myer (2002).  Construct validity of the TAS:O 
was evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis.  Reliability was tested using an 
internal consistency model.  In addition, this research analyzed the capacity of the 
TAS:O to distinguish among mild, moderate, marked and severe reactions of 
organizations to crises.   
The subject of organizational crises does not have a long history in scholarly 
literature (Fink, 2002).  However, because of new threats that have fundamentally 
changed the organizational world (Mitroff, 2004), literature on this topic is rapidly 
expanding.  Though the goal of this study is to analyze the psychometric properties of 
an instrument that purports to measure organizational reactions to crises, this 
literature review is not a review of empirical research.  Primarily, this is because 
crisis literature has focused on providing aid and support rather than empirical data 
(Myer & Moore, 2004).  This is not unusual considering the first response in crisis 
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intervention is to provide aid and support (McFarlane, 2000), not to perform 
systematic research (Raphael, Wilson, Meldrum, & McFarlane, 1996).    
This literature review is divided into three main sections.  The first section 
explores the structure of modern organizational crisis management, which is 
generally considered to be a little over 20 years old.    The second section describes 
characteristics of organizational reactions to crises.  Evaluating organizational 
reactions to crises demonstrates that a model of crisis management is more effective 
for handling organizational crises than haphazard methods.  Finally, the third section 
of this literature review describes the Triage Assessment Model (Myer et al., 1992) 
and its relevance to organizational crises.   
Organizational Crisis Management 
Organizational crisis management begins with planning for a crisis (Fink, 2002), and 
includes resolving the uncertainty by allowing organizations to regain homeostasis 
(Fink; Mitroff, 2004; Mitroff et al., 1996).  Four main phases appear to emerge from 
the literature that summarize organizational crisis management.   These four major 
phases of organizational crisis management are: (a) prevention, (b) preparation, (c) 
response, and (d) recovery.  Each of these phases can be regarded as a means to 
facilitate organizational management of crises.      
Prevention primarily involves the physical precautions organizations take to 
ensure safety.  Prevention entails the tasks organizations actually complete to 
safeguard the workers, stakeholders and surrounding community (Rapoport, 1965).  
By not taking preventative steps, disasters can happen.  For example, after Union 
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Carbide’s infamous disaster that killed 4,000 people at their Bhopal, India plant in 
1984, their American counterparts thoroughly examined the specific preventative 
steps they used for containing the lethal gas methyl isocyanate (MIC).  Prevention, 
therefore, not only occurs at the start-up phase of organizations, but is also a part of 
their ongoing crisis management.    
In the business world, efforts continue to be made in regard to preparing 
organizations for what might occur (Braverman, 1999; Fink 2002; Mitroff & 
Anagnos, 2001; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Winter & Steger, 1998).  Research has 
demonstrated that effectively prepared organizations can significantly lessen the 
damage that results from crises (Fink; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Mitroff et al. (1996) 
found a positive correlation between crisis prepared organizations and their ability to 
effectively handle crises.  Though literature for organizational crises differs on 
methods that constitute specifically what crisis preparation means, organizational 
crisis literature (e.g., Barton, 2001; Fink, 2002; Laye, 2002; Mitroff, 2004; Mitroff & 
Anagnos, 2001; Mitroff et al., 1996; Parsons, 1996; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2001) seems to agree that having a crisis plan is a necessary though not 
sufficient aspect of crisis preparation.  A crisis plan is therefore vital to organizational 
crisis management (e.g., Braverman; Fink; Laye; Mitroff; Mitroff & Anagnos; 
Pauchant & Mitroff; Weick & Sutcliffe). 
Unfortunately, regardless of the time and effort put into preparing 
organizations for crises, ultimately, nothing can stop some crises from occurring 
(Fink, 2002; Mitroff & Anagnos, 2001).  Once a crisis occurs, the immediate 
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behavior an organization exhibits is the response phase.  Many authors (e.g., 
Braverman, 1999; Fink; Mitroff & Anagnos; Mitroff et al., 1996; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001) have described reactions that have enhanced or destroyed organizations at this 
phase of organizational management.  An example of an effective organizational 
response occurred in 1982.  Johnson & Johnson responded to having their Tylenol 
capsules laced with cyanide, and seven subsequent deaths, by being open with the 
press, and willing to recall their product at all costs (Fink).  This response saved the 
company, and is generally regarded as a model of effective organizational response to 
crisis (Fink; Mitroff & Anagnos; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Winter & Steger, 1999).  
Thus, the response phase is usually defined as the acute phase (Roberts, 2000).  Once 
the response phase has been initiated, the focus becomes assessing the situation.      
Whether it is formal or informal, the first step organizations usually take 
during the response phase is assessment (Laye, 2002; Levinson, 2002).  Only a 
limited amount of time exists to do post-crisis assessments (Myer et al, 1992), but 
assessing the damage done is vital to planning how organizations will handle crises 
(Levinson).  Albrecht (1983) noted that assessing organizational reactions to a crisis 
entails understanding the culture of the organization, and at least part of the 
organizational culture can be understood by examining the bureaucratic hierarchy 
(Brown et al., 2001).  Examining the hierarchy is often an early, if not first step in 
organizational assessment (Brown et al.).  Primarily, the hierarchy is examined early 
so the most pragmatic channels of communication can be established (Brown et al.).  
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However organizations choose to assess a crisis, assessment is a vital part of the 
response phase.   
Based on a summary of current crisis literature, the final phase in 
organizational crisis management appears to be the recovery phase.  During this 
phase, organizations implement strategies to address the results of their assessment.  
Whether or not this implementation is ill-prepared and ineffective, as in the case of 
Bhopal (Fink, 2002), or well prepared and effective, as in the case of the 1982 
Tylenol crisis, organizations focus on what they deem appropriate from their 
assessment.  Generally, during the recovery phase, organizations implement short-
term and long-term business recovery programs to assist the recommencement of 
normal business operations (Mitroff et al., 1996).     
A complete literature review thus seems to divide organizational crisis 
management into four main phases: prevention, preparation, response and recovery.  
Each of these phases is an important part of crisis management, and each appears 
interconnected to the next.  Historically, regardless of the level of effectiveness, 
organizations appear to move through all four phases.  The more ineffective 
organizations are during earlier stages, the less likely they are to do well in the 
recovery phase.        
Characteristics of Organizational Reactions 
Organizations, like human beings, have energy and emotion, and are affected 
by other systems (Levinson, 2002).  Organizations undergo damage from their 
environments (Levinson), and like human beings, react in disparaging ways (Weaver, 
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1988).  Therefore, just as human beings react affectively, behaviorally and 
cognitively to crises (Myer, 2001), organizations react the same way (Pearson & 
Clair, 1998).  In fact, just as human beings have complicated reactions to crises, so do 
organizations (Brown et al., 2001).   
Specific indicators exist that describe how organizations react to crises.  For 
example, organizations react affectively to crises (Myer, 2002; Pearson & Clair) 
through difficulties with morale (Paton et al., 2000; Sagini, 2001), rumors (DiFonzo 
& Bordia, 2000) and loyalty (Schein, 1985).  Organizations exhibit behavioral 
responses through problems with meeting agendas (Greenstone & Leviton, 2002), 
organizational roles (Paton et al., 2000) and level of functioning (Myer).  
Organizational reactions that are cognitive in nature exhibit obstructions in decision-
making, system dynamics and organizational goals (Myer).  Hence, organizations 
appear to specifically react to crises in affective, behavioral and cognitive ways.            
Affective Reactions  
 People’s work performances can be affected by their emotions (Sagini, 2001), 
and organizational crises affect how people feel.  Thus, affect plays a significant role 
in organizational crises (Pearson & Clair, 1998) because it has an impact on people in 
their work.  In reality, the emotional state that organizations undergo after a crisis is 
one of the most important aspects of any crisis situation (Mitroff et al., 1996).  Some 
organizations have a tendency to suppress emotional reactions, which leads to an 
increase in their vulnerability (Paton et al., 2000).  Others take immediate action and 
can halt the emotional pain that is created by organizational crises (Greenstone & 
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Leviton, 2002).  Thus, organizations that effectively and immediately assess their 
affective responses to crises seem to have a better success in the long run than 
organizations that suppress affective responses.  
Myer (2002) noted that affective responses are most often exemplified 
through problems with morale, rumors and loyalty.  Morale is the basic tenet by 
which organizations gauge their emotional selves (Brenneman, 2000).  Managers are 
often deemed effective if they can boost organizational morale (Greenstone & 
Leviton, 2002).  Morale boosting and dismemberment are accomplished through 
communication (Williams, 1978).  For morale to be boosted or maintained, an 
organization must become successful at communicating information to its employees 
(Mitroff et al., 1996).  In fact, in times of crises, Lernbinger (1997) noted that 
employers have a responsibility to communicate fully to their employees.  
Unfortunately, miscommunications occur frequently after crises (James & Gilliland, 
2001; Myer, 2001), and this often leads to dismemberment (Williams).                  
 Rumors are unconfirmed bits of information that are important to people 
(DiFonzo & Bordia, 2000).  Because crises leave many questions unconfirmed, after 
crises organizations become susceptible to rumors.  People tend to use rumors to 
bring a sense of meaning and control to events that are perceived as overwhelming or 
uncontrollable (DiFonzo & Bordia).  Before, during, or after crises, rumors are used 
as defense mechanisms to clarify or justify the situation (Mitroff et al., 1996).  
Unfortunately, simply understanding that rumors are used as defense mechanisms 
does not lessen the harmful effects on recovering organizations (DiFonzo & Bordia).  
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However, if an organization is aware of the causes and effects of rumors, it will be 
much less likely to allow rumors to be used as defense mechanisms (Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992).    
 Organizations are damaged by rumors because rumors tend to produce anxiety 
(Wetlaufer, 2000).  Anxiousness typically stems from feeling threatened with no way 
out (May, 1950).  In other words, anxiety comes from the perception of not having 
control over a situation.  Anxiety is deleterious to an organization because it tends to 
cue a state of anxiety in the members of an organization (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).  
Counselors from many theoretical approaches would agree that the best way to deal 
with anxiety is to confront it (Corey, 1996; Sharf, 2004).  But as the tenets of 
Freudian thought have taught us, we cannot confront what we do not know exists 
(Corey; Sharf).  Unfortunately, identifying rumors is not a part of extant 
organizational crisis assessment instruments.          
 The strength of organizations’ cultures is positively correlated with loyalty 
(Schein, 1985).  Loyalty is the degree to which an organization can accept and use a 
set of beliefs through the use of language and symbols (Sagini, 2001).  Sagini noted 
that loyalty produces an effective conformity in that the goals of the individual and 
the organization are the same.  Without loyalty, the strength of organizations can 
rapidly deteriorate (Sagini).  In fact, Braverman (1999) noted that when loyalty is low 
an increase in potential violence occurs.  Thus, loyalty is an essential aspect of 
organizations’ affective responses to crises.        
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 Affective responses are measures of organizations’ morale, rumors and 
loyalty.  Because ineffective communication appears to lessen the quality of each, it 
is important for organizations to identify sub-par communications as quickly as 
possible.  By identifying specific aspects of organizations’ ineffective affective 
responses, organizations will have the opportunity to address troubled areas more 
precisely.       
Behavioral Reactions  
Pearson & Clair (1998) noted that a crisis pushes an organization into action.  
Action is the keystone of behavioral responses of organizations to crises.  Behavioral 
responses can be described as empirically observable events (Glassman, 2000).  It is 
significant to understand the post-crisis behavioral responses of organizations because 
these responses affect the future of the entire organization (Banner & Gagne, 1995).  
Three empirically observable ways that organizations respond to crises are: disrupted 
meeting agendas, distorted roles and altered levels of functioning (Myer, 2002; Myer 
& Conte, 2004).  
Meeting agendas dictate the direction of organizations (Moorhead & Griffin, 
1989).  When an organization is preoccupied with a crisis, however, the agenda of a 
meeting can be significantly altered (Greenstone & Leviton, 2002).  The agendas are 
altered to focus on the present crisis (Wetlaufer, 2000); and as Myer & Conte (2004) 
noted, common sense dictates that in a time-limited meeting, whatever time an 
organization devotes to a crisis takes away time from the normal business agenda. 
Though it is effective for post-crisis meeting agendas to become solution-focused 
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until the crisis is resolved, that does not always happen (Braverman, 1999; Fink, 
2002).    
Anytime rules and procedures are a dominant part of an organization, roles are 
important (Moorhead & Griffin, 1989).  Roles can be defined as the part individuals 
play in a work group (Moorhead & Griffin).  Specifically, roles encompass sets of 
expected behavior patterns attributed to individuals occupying a given position in an 
organization (Robbins, 1993).  Healthy organizations have well defined roles, and 
those who carry out the stated roles do so without role ambiguity (Moorhead & 
Griffin; Robbins).    
Frequently during a crisis, organizational roles can become distorted due to 
the disruption of day-to-day routines (Paton et al., 2000).  When roles are distorted, 
role conflict occurs (Robbins, 1993), and organizations cannot communicate and/or 
respond to previously stated expectations (Moorhead & Griffin, 1989; Schermerhorn 
et al., 1994).  Distorted roles cause problems for organizations because they inhibit 
effective distribution of responsibilities (Myer & Conte, 2004).  Therefore, roles must 
be clear and unambiguous for the crisis to be resolved, and for the organization to 
recover.  Once roles are clearly defined and implemented, organizations begin to 
operate at a higher level of functioning (Moorhead & Griffin; Schermerhorn et al.).                              
  Whether it is effective or ineffective functioning, organizations operate at a 
certain level of functioning (Myer & Conte, 2004).  The goal of organizations in 
regard to functioning is to maintain homeostasis (Sagini, 2001).  By its very 
definition, a crisis has an impact on an organization’s level of functioning.  A 
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pragmatic example of an organization’s level of functioning being impacted is the 
statistic that employees tend to take excessive time off work after a crisis (Greenstone 
& Leviton, 2002).  Another example occurs when decision makers ignore threats that 
have the potential to physically take them out of the situation (Myer & Conte).  For 
instance, it is difficult to maintain a certain level of functioning when decision makers 
are either incommunicado or in absentia (Fink, 2002).  
Organizations’ behavioral responses are explicit in that they can be 
empirically measured.  Meeting agendas, roles, and levels of functioning are all 
aspects of organizations’ behavioral responses to crises.  Theoretically, if 
organizations can identify maladaptive behavioral responses to crises, they augment 
their chances of handling crises effectively.        
Cognitive Reactions  
 As with affective and behavioral responses, an organization will also react in 
specific cognitive ways (Pearson & Clair, 1998).  People’s thoughts play a major role 
in creating vulnerabilities (McEntire, 2001).  Myer (2002) noted that the cognitive 
reactions of organizations center on decision-making, organizational goals and system 
dynamics.  Whereas all three of these organizational cognitive responses are 
interdependent (Myer & Conte, 2004), they are also independently significant.  The 
interdependence of decision-making, goals and dynamics occurs in many 
combinations.  For instance, organizational decisions can affect organizational goals, 
which, in turn, affect the dynamics of the system (Myer & Conte).  Another example 
of this interdependence could occur if the dynamics of the system influence the goals, 
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and thus the way organizations make decisions.  Mathematically, there would be six 
combinations demonstrating the interdependence of the three proposed cognitive 
responses of organizations.  If the intention of organizations is to get to the root of the 
problem, it is important to single out the most significant cognitive response. 
 The staple of any organization is decision-making (Moorhead & Griffin, 
1989).  Without decision-making, there can be no organizational goals (Moorhead & 
Griffin; Sagini, 2001).  Simply put, an organization cannot subsist without decision-
making (Myer & Conte, 2004).  After all, little can be accomplished when decision-
making goes awry.  Banner & Gagne (1995) noted that it has been demonstrated 
through systems theory that everything affects everything else.  During or after a 
crisis, the decisions made affect the entire organization (Myer & Conte). 
 Unfortunately, it is common for organizations to have difficulty with decision-
making during and after a crisis (Greentstone & Leviton, 2002).  During crises, 
pressure to make effective decisions is augmented by perceived time constraints and 
strained by cognitive limitations (Pearson & Clair, 1998).  Difficulty occurs, 
according to Fink (2002), when decision-makers demonstrate premature closure; that 
is, when decision-makers act without considering all of the available alternatives.  
Fink also noted that during a crisis, organizations tend to rely too much on cognitive 
rather than behavioral decision-making.  In other words, it is important for decision-
makers to ask the question, “What do we have to do to produce the best solution?” 
(Fink).  Often what needs to be done is a reevaluation of organizational goals (Myer 
& Conte, 2004). 
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 Mitroff et al. (1996) noted that after, and even during a crisis, the goals of 
organizations change.  The severity of the crisis determines whether or not these 
changes signify a problem for organizations (Myer & Conte, 2004).  At a minimum, 
organizations have to expel some energy toward resolving a crisis, because to not do 
so is too ineffective (Braverman, 1999; Mitroff et al.).  Seen in this light, 
organizational goals are affected in some way by a crisis.                        
 To understand the impact of an organization’s inability to see how its goals 
are being altered during a crisis, an analog can be drawn from counseling.  
Individuals often come to counseling with little or no insight into their problems 
(Corey, 1996; Sharf, 2004), but with only a vague idea that something is wrong.  
Effective counselors challenge client’s introjections (Perls, 1973) and assumptions 
about the world (Corey; Sharf) to increase insights.  Similarly, if organizations can 
become aware of their introjected ways of responding to a crisis, they can establish 
more clear goals (Myer & Conte, 2004).                  
Both the decisions and goals of an organization affect the system dynamics.  
System dynamics are the interactions among groups and individuals in a given 
system.    Decision-makers establish organizational goals, and organizational goals 
directly affect the system dynamics.  Problems enter a system when responsibility is 
not accepted (M. Krushinski, personal communication, September 28, 2003).  
Unfortunately, a natural tendency exists for decision-makers to shift blame away from 
themselves during a crisis (Banner & Gagne, 1995).  As a different entity in the 
situation, blame directly affects system dynamics (Banner & Gagne). 
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Like the affective and behavioral responses of organizations to crises, 
cognitive responses also must be evaluated to accurately complete an effective post-
crisis assessment (Myer & Conte, 2004).  Cognitive responses are observed through 
organizational decisions, goals, and system dynamics (Myer & Conte).  While each of 
these is independently important, each is interdependent on the other.  As with 
affective and behavioral responses, Pearson & Clair (1998) noted that identifying 
ineffective cognitive responses early leads to more effective handling of 
organizational crises.       
The Triage Assessment Model 
A careful examination of the literature reveals that few existing models of 
organizational crisis management address the human impact of crises.  The Triage 
Assessment Model (TAM) (Myer, Williams, Ottens, & Schmidt, 1992) addresses the 
human impact of crises, but was developed for individuals.  However, the TAM can 
be an analog for organizations because, as Fink (2002) noted, the way that people 
plan for or respond to personal crises is not much different than the way organizations 
plan for or respond to crises.   
  The TAM has been demonstrated to be an effective crisis management 
model for individuals (Myer et al., 1992).  The Triage Assessment Survey: 
Organizations (TAS:O) (Myer, 2002) has been adapted from the TAM.  The TAS:O, 
which has been created from a rational-theoretical approach (Lanyon & Goldstein, 
1997) and has legitimate face validity, was developed to determine whether the TAM 
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might be used as an effective comprehensive model for assessing organizational 
reactions to crises.   
The TAM is based on the concept that has been around since the birth of 
psychology: namely, that understanding pathology can be a resource for improving 
health (Brown, 1997; Glassman, 2000; Maxmen & Ward, 1995).  Specifically, the 
model was intended to assess individual responses to crises across three domains: (a) 
affective, (b) behavioral, and (c) cognitive (Myer et al.).  These three domains are 
further subdivided into three categories each. 
Myer et al., (1992) determined that the affective domain includes reactions 
based on research of primary emotions: anger, fear and sadness. According to Myer et 
al., the three behavioral reactions to crises occur as some form of: approach, 
avoidance and immobility.  Lastly, the cognitive reactions of individuals are 
classified as a threat, loss or transgression (Myer et al.).  While Myer (2001) noted 
that these three domains (affect, behavior and cognition) should be viewed in light of 
individual cultural backgrounds, Kluckhohn (1961) demonstrated that peoples of all 
cultures feel, act and think.  Thus, though individual cultural backgrounds are 
important to consider, it is more significant to note that all human beings react 
affectively, behaviorally and cognitively to crises.  Pearson & Clair (1998) noted that 
organizations, despite vast differences in culture, also react affectively, behaviorally 
and cognitively to crises.    
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The Triage Assessment Model Adapted for Organizations 
Myer & Conte (2004) theorized that the TAM can be adapted by organizations 
to assess their reactions to crises.  As stated previously, no matter how well prepared 
an organization is, crises will occur (Braverman, 1999; Fink, 2002; Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992).  Any given organization will react with affective, behavioral and 
cognitive responses (Pearson & Clair, 1998), which are the three primary target areas 
of the TAM.       
 A healthy recovery for crisis-struck organizations involves using pattern 
exploration as a diagnostic tool (Brown, 1997).  In other words, rather than evaluating 
people as isolated entities, pattern exploration is a means to observe the aggregate of 
organizational behavior.  The TAM does this by assessing the patterns that 
individuals demonstrate after a crisis (Myer, 2001).  The use of pattern exploration 
allows organizations to focus their time, energy and resources in the most appropriate 
direction (Myer & Conte, 2004).  As Brown noted, pattern exploration enables 
organizations to see, hear and feel what they otherwise would not be able to.  The 
TAM has been adapted for organizations to use for post-crisis pattern exploration 
(Myer & Conte).         
Several advantages exist to using the TAM in organizational assessment.  An 
important advantage is the TAM promotes autonomy.  Deetz et al. (2000) noted that 
autonomy alone sustains organizations.  Because organizations benefit from increased 
autonomy (Brown et al., 2001), the TAM emphasizes managerial rather than outside 
support (Myer & Conte, 2004).  The advantage to managerial support goes beyond 
                                                                                                                      30
 
 
self-sufficiency.  Unfortunately, a reality is that crisis workers may have seen a 
particular crisis problem so many times in the past that they may generalize 
individual reactions (Myer, 2001).  It is a logical progression to assume that by 
teaching the TAM to managers, organizations will increase their autonomy.  After all, 
instead of relying on outside consultants for effective crisis treatment, organizations 
whose managers are trained in the TAM can contain crises without outside help.     
Summary 
 This chapter explored the structure of modern organizational crisis 
management, characteristics of organizational reactions to crises, and how the Triage 
Assessment Model applies to organizational crises.  First, each of the four major 
phases of organizational crisis: (a) prevention; (b) preparation; (c) response; and (d) 
recovery, were described.  The first phase involves risk assessment, the second entails 
business impact analysis, the third describes organizations’ responses to a crisis, and 
the fourth depicts how organizations attempt to recover from a crisis.  Understanding 
these four phases allows organizations to have a better chance of effectively handling 
crises.     
 Next, this chapter explored characteristics of organizational reactions to 
crises.  The crux of the present study relied on Pearson and Clair’s (1998) statement 
that organizations, like people, react affectively, behaviorally, and cognitively to 
crises.  Thus, the manifestations of organization’s affective, behavioral, and cognitive 
reactions were evaluated.   
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 Finally, this chapter explored the Triage Assessment Model and its relevance 
to organizational crises.  The Triage Assessment Model for crisis management is 
based on the premise that people react to crises in affective, behavioral, or cognitive 
responses.  Adapting the Triage Assessment Model to organizations set the context 
for the present study; namely, to analyze the structure of an instrument that measures 
organizations’ affective, behavioral, and cognitive responses to crises.     
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY  
 
 The purpose of this research was to analyze the structure of the Triage 
Assessment Survey: Organizations (TAS:O), developed by Myer (2002).  
Specifically, construct validity of the TAS:O was evaluated using confirmatory factor 
analysis.  Reliability was tested using an internal consistency model.  In addition, this 
research analyzed the capacity of the TAS:O to distinguish among mild, moderate, 
marked and severe reactions of organizations to crises.  In this chapter, participants, 
the instrument being used for the research, the research design, materials needed for 
the study, the procedure, data analysis, and hypotheses for this study will be 
described. This chapter introduces the reader to the methodology used.   
Sample 
 The target population for this study is any person working in an organization.  
The accessible population for this study was collected through convenience sampling.  
Specifically, the participants consisted of 117 college students enrolled in graduate 
programs.  Of the 117 participants who volunteered for this study, 56% were female, 
and 44% were male.  The average age of the participants was 28 years old.  The 
participants had an average work experience of 5.48 years.  Twenty-one percent of 
the participants had work experience with non-profit organizations, 24% with for-
profit organizations, 33% with human service organizations, 9% with service 
enterprise organizations, 5% with merchandiser organizations, 1% with 
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manufacturing firms, and 2% had experience with “other” organizations. Eighty-one 
percent of the participants had Bachelor’s degrees, while 19% had Master’s degrees.  
The ethnic backgrounds of the participants were as follows: 91% White; 7% Black; 
1% Asian; and 1% Hispanic.  All of the participants were U.S. citizens.        
Instrument 
 The purpose of the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations (TAS:O) is to 
sample people's perceptions of how their organization is reacting to a crisis (Myer, 
2002).  This instrument was designed from a rational-theoretical approach (Lanyon & 
Goodstein, 1997) that assigned meaning to the items presented.  In other words, the 
instrument’s author believed that the items tap into the constructs in which he was 
interested (Lanyon & Goodstein).  Thus, an example of the author’s sampling from 
the universal content for organizational responses to crises occurs in item number 2, 
“Assigned responsibilities have not changed.”   This item specifically asks 
respondents about behavior that indirectly reflects the construct of organizational 
behavioral responses via understanding whether or not any “assigned responsibilities” 
have changed.  
It was through this rational-theoretical approach that content validity was 
established for the TAS:O.  Content validity is determined by an in-depth analysis of 
an instrument by an expert who is knowledgeable about the content domain 
(Friedenberg, 1995).   More specifically, the TAS:O was created and revised by an 
expert consultant who used research and experience to establish that the items on the 
TAS:O drawn from the universal content are actually representative of the three 
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constructs (affect, behavior and cognition).  For example, the author used experience 
to determine that the number and content of the items on the TAS:O adequately 
represent the concept of organizational affect.  In other words, for the TAS:O to 
exhibit content validity, the items should be of a proportional number and type of the 
universal content.   
The items for the TAS:O were examined using qualitative item-writing 
criteria (Edwards, 1957), including (a) writing items in the present tense; (b) avoiding 
double-barrelled items; (c) avoiding ambiguous statements; (d) avoiding statements 
that were irrelevant to organizational crises; (e) avoiding the words “never,” “all,” 
“always,” and “none” (often named specific determiners); and (f) avoiding statements 
longer than 20 words.  Items deemed unacceptable were revised or eliminated (R. 
Myer, personal communication, December 3, 2004), and the remaining 27 items 
served as the TAS:O.  A copy of the TAS:O can be found in Appendix A.   
The TAS:O is a 27-item, 5-point Likert summated rating scale.  Likert 
responses range from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.  According to Myer 
(2002), the score for each item ranges from 1 to 5.  Items marked Strongly Disagree 
are assigned 1 point; items marked Disagree are assigned 2 points, items marked 
Agree are assigned 4 points, and items marked Strongly Agree are assigned 5 points.  
For all items, Not Sure is assigned 3 points (R. Myer, personal communication, June 
10, 2004).   
The rationale for assigning items marked Strongly Disagree 1 point can be 
understood by examining item number 5, “Pride in the organization has faded.”  
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People who do not perceive that pride in the organization has faded will likely mark 
Strongly Disagree.  The more items that are marked Strongly Disagree will lead to a 
lower composite score, indicating that the organization is perceived to be 
experiencing a less severe crisis.  Following this rationale, Disagree is assigned 2 
points and Agree is assigned 4 points.  Strongly Agree is assigned 5 points because it 
is assumed that people who believe that pride in the organization has faded will mark 
Strongly Agree to item number 5; thus leading to a higher composite score and an 
indication of a more severe crisis.  It should be noted that for items 1, 2, 7, 8, 18, 19, 
20, 25, and 26, reverse scoring occurs.   
The total summated raw scores for this instrument ranges from 27 - 135.  If 
more than six items are omitted, the form is considered incomplete (R. Myer, 
personal communication, April, 20, 2004).  Myer (2002) theorized that the total 
scores for the TAS:O will be arbitrarily classified, but based on a cross tabulation 
between expected scores and actual scores.  In other words, composite scores that fall 
between 108 -135 will be classified as a severe reaction to a crisis.  Scores that fall 
between 81-108 will be classified as a marked reaction to a crisis.  Scores that fall 
between 54 - 81 will be coded as a moderate reaction to a crisis.  Finally, scores that 
fall between 27-54 will be identified as mild reactions to a crisis.  Table 2 illustrates 
the hypothesized classification system for scoring the TAS:O.  This classification 
scheme was examined using a chi-square goodness of fit test.   
Along with the total scores, the total subscale scores were also analyzed.  The 
TAS:O has three subscales (Myer, 2002).  The subscales are Affective responses, 
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Behavioral responses, and Cognitive responses.  Each subscale has nine items 
devoted to it.  Specifically, items 1, 3, 5, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18, and 21 fall within the 
Affective subscale.  Items 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 19, 22, 24, and 25 fall within the Behavioral 
subscale; and items 6, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, 23, 26 and 27 fall within the Cognitive 
subscale.  Higher scores on a particular subscale indicate an organizational need to 
address that area (Myer).  For example, the higher the collective total score on the 
affective subscale, the greater the necessity for the organization to address affective 
responses (Myer).    
Design 
 This study is a quantitative, true-experiment that utilizes a one way, between- 
subjects experimental design.  The participants were exposed to the entire treatment 
(X).  Specifically, the participants took the TAS:O in response to a mild, moderate, 
marked and severe crisis scenario.  Each participant read all four scenarios and 
responded to the TAS:O four times.  Participants were given the scenarios in a 
random order.  One example of the possible combinations of the independent 
variables was to present the participants with the moderate crisis scenario first, 
followed by the severe crisis scenario, then the mild crisis scenario, and lastly the 
marked crisis scenario.  Participants had a random chance of being exposed to one of 
24 possible combinations of the four scenarios.  After reading all four organizational 
crisis scenarios and responding to four TAS:O surveys, the total scores that the 
participants provided make up one observation of the dependent variable (O).  The 
subscale scores were another observation of the dependent variable.  An illustration 
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of this design can be found in Table 1.   
Table 1 
Illustration of the Design of the Study 
R  (Random assignment) X1  (Response to the 
TAS:O after reading the 
mild crisis scenario) 
O1  (Score on TAS:O after 
reading the mild scenario) 
   X2  (Response to the 
TAS:O after reading the 
moderate crisis scenario) 
O2  (Score on TAS:O after 
reading the moderate 
scenario) 
 X3  (Response to the 
TAS:O after reading the 
marked crisis scenario) 
O3  (Score on TAS:O after 
reading marked scenario) 
 X4  (Response to the 
TAS:O after reading the 
severe crisis scenario) 
O4  (Score on TAS:O after 
reading severe scenario) 
  
Procedure 
Before any research was performed, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) was 
contacted for approval.  The appropriate guidelines outlined by the American 
Counseling Association’s Code of Ethics, specifically Section G: Research and 
publication (Welfel, 2002) were followed.  A pilot study was conducted before the 
present research was performed.  A description of the pilot study can be found in 
Appendix E.   
Participants were introduced to the study and informed of any potential risks 
or benefits that may occur from participating in this research.  A copy of the informed 
consent can be found in Appendix B.  Participants were given pencils and a copy of 
either a mild, moderate, marked, or severe crisis scenario, and a copy of the TAS:O.  
The scenarios are provided in Appendix C.  Participants were asked to read the 
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scenario and then fill out the TAS:O.  The specific directions that the participants 
heard were: 
“Your packet contains four case scenarios for you to read and four 
surveys for you to fill out.  Each scenario describes an organization 
experiencing a crisis.  Please read the scenario and then fill out the 
corresponding survey as if you were a member of the organization described 
in the scenario.  Please mark your answers with a number 2 pencil on the 
scantron answer sheet provided.   When you have finished filling out all four 
scenarios, please leave the room until everyone is finished.   Does anyone 
have any questions?  If any questions come up while you are taking the 
survey, please raise your hand and I’ll be happy to answer them for you.”  
Participants filled in their responses to the TAS:O on a scantron answer 
sheets.  The scantron sheets were scored and a copy of the answers in alphabet form 
(a, b, c, d, or e) were obtained.  A program was written to convert the data to 
numerical form.  The numerical answers were put in Microsoft Excel before being 
pasted into SPSS.     
Scenarios were used to simulate organizational crisis situations.  When 
researchers are evaluating test validity, scenarios are used for their predictive qualities 
(Hirschhorn, 1980).  Hirschhorn described two different approaches to writing 
scenarios: process approach and developmental approach.  The process approach is 
used when the goal of the scenario is to provide a sequence of events that led to the 
present condition (Hirschhorn).  Developmental scenarios are based on the 
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assumption that the entire happenings in the scenarios are interconnected 
(Hirschhorn).  For this study, the scenarios were created based on a combination of 
the process approach and developmental approach.  The process approach was used 
insofar as the scenarios incorporated a series of events that occurred and continue to 
occur throughout an organization.  The developmental approach was utilized because 
crises affect organizations as a whole.  In other words, a rumor on the first floor of an 
organization can affect the moral on the second floor, which can affect production on 
the third floor and alter decision making on the top floor.  The scenarios can be found 
in Appendix C.        
Data Analysis 
Because the TAS:O has not yet been empirically tested to determine its 
validity and reliability, data will be analyzed using the SPSS 12.0 RELIABILITY and 
FACTOR ANALYSIS programs (Norusis, 1988).  First, the reliability of the TAS:O 
was determined by running the following three tests: Cronbach’s alpha, a Spearman-
Brown formula split-half reliability, and item total correlation.  To determine whether 
or not mean differences exist among the four scenarios, an ANOVA was run on the 
total score and a MANOVA was run on the three (affect, behavior, cognition) total 
subscale scores.  In order to test the construct validity of the TAS:O, factor analysis 
was used.  Specifically, confirmatory factor analysis was run on the data to determine 
to what degree the three factors (affect, behavior and cognition) on the TAS:O are 
represented by individuals’ responses of an organization’s reaction to mild, moderate, 
marked, and severe crisis scenarios.  Confirmatory factor analysis was used for three 
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reasons: (a) the a priori hypothesis stated that the TAS:O would measure 3 factors, (b) 
interpretability of the factor solution followed the a priori hypothesis, and (c) the 
Scree test indicated that the TAS:O would best be described by a 3 factor solution.   
Instruments in the social sciences must have reliability (Friedenberg, 1995).  
Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which an instrument measures 
whatever it is measuring (Cozby, 2001; LaFountain & Bartos, 2002).  Reliability can 
be tested three different ways: test-retest reliability, alternate forms reliability, or 
internal consistency (Friedenberg).   However, reliability is most frequently reported 
through the use of internal consistency (Houser, 1998). Internal consistency 
demonstrates reliability by describing the homogeneity of the items (Friedenberg, 
1995; Heppner et al., 1999).   
The test-retest reliability method was not chosen because in order to conduct a 
repeated measures design, four equivalent scenarios would have to be created.  
Because a crisis is defined as a perception of an event, creating equivalent scenarios 
would have posed significant threats to the reliability.  Alternate forms reliability was 
not an option because only one form of the TAS:O currently exists.  Thus, the TAS:O 
was tested using an internal consistency model.  Specifically, a Cronbach’s alpha, 
Spearman-Brown test, and an inter-item total correlation were run on the TAS:O.      
To conduct an internal consistency study, the instrument only has to be 
administered one time (Heppner et al., 1999).  One test of internal consistency is the 
Cronbach’s alpha.  The Cronbach’s alpha calculates the correlation of each item with 
every other item (Cozby, 2001).  A Cronbach’s alpha was completed on the data 
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using SPSS computer software.  First, a Cronbach’s alpha was run on the total score.  
Next, individual Cronbach’s alphas were run on the predicted Affect, Behavior, and 
Cognitive subscales.   By doing so, all the items were compared on the TAS:O that 
involve affect with only the Affective subscale scores, all the items that correspond 
with behavior with only the Behavioral subscale scores, all the items that describe the 
cognition with only the Cognitive subscale scores.  
To more thoroughly examine the internal consistency of this instrument, a 
Spearman-Brown formula was also run on the data.  Like Cronbach’s alpha, the 
Spearman-Brown formula, or split-half reliability test, also only requires a single 
admission to participants (LaFountain & Bartos, 2002).  For the Spearman-Brown 
formula, the items on the TAS:O were divided into two comparable odd/even halves.  
The scores from the two halves were correlated and calculated.  However, since the 
split-half technique tends to overestimate the reliability (LaFountain & Bartos), a 
third method of testing reliability was used.   
The final step used to determine the internal consistency of the TAS:O was 
the use of item total correlation.  Item total correlation analyzes the correlation 
between each item and the total test score (Murphy & Davidshofer, 2001).  Typically 
researchers hope for a positive correlation, as a correlation coefficient near zero 
shows no association, and a negative correlation coefficient demonstrates that the 
item actually disagrees with the test (Murphy & Davidshofer).  A key advantage to 
using item total correlation is the data can be treated as a correlation coefficient and 
the variance can be explained (Murphy & Davidshofer).   
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A goal of this research is to gather preliminary information on the differences 
among mild, moderate, marked and severe crises.  Four groups of scores were 
analyzed for this study.  The statistical test that is typically used to compare the 
means of more than two groups is an ANOVA (LaFountain & Bartos, 2002).  In other 
words, an ANOVA is typically used when a statistical design utilizes more than two 
independent variables (Cozby, 2001).   
Three main assumptions exist that must be met for an ANOVA to be the 
appropriate statistical test (Green, Salkind, & Akey, 2000).  The three assumptions 
are: (a) the dependent variable is normally distributed for the different factors, (b) the 
variances of the dependent variable are the same for all the groups, and (c) the cases 
must represent random samples from the population, and the scores on the test 
variable are independent of each other (Green et al., 2000).  With these assumptions 
met, an ANOVA was run on the data to evaluate whether or not a statistically 
significant difference exists among the responses to the mild, moderate, marked and 
severe scenarios.   
Because running several ANOVAs on the same data increases the familywise 
error rate, a multivariate analysis of variance test or MANOVA is used to evaluate 
multiple dependent variables (Field, 2000).  A MANOVA reduces the possibility of 
making a type I error when multiple dependent variables are involved (Field).  Like 
the ANOVA, three main assumptions underlie the MANOVA (Green et al., 2000).  
The three assumptions underlying a MANOVA are: (a) the dependent variables are 
multivariately normally distributed for each population, with the different populations 
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being defined by levels of the factor; (b) the population variances and covariances 
among the dependent variables are the same across all levels of the factor; and (c) the 
subjects are randomly sampled, and the score on a variable for any one participant is 
independent from the scores on this variable for all other participants (Green et al.).  
With these assumptions in mind, a MANOVA was run on the three (affect, behavior, 
cognition) total subscale scores.  The three total subscale scores comprised the three 
dependent variables.    
While the rational-theoretical approach to test-construction is a necessary step, 
it is not sufficient to establish a useful and valid test (Lanyon & Goldstein, 1997).  
Therefore, the construct validity of the TAS:O was examined next.  In order to test 
the validity of the TAS:O, factor analysis was used.  Factor analysis is typically used 
in the social sciences in the development of objective tests measuring concepts 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), such as affect, behavior, or cognition.  More precisely, 
factor analysis is a reductive statistical technique that is used to describe a relatively 
small number of factors that are used to represent relationships among sets of many 
interrelated variables (Norusis, 1985).  The goal of factor analysis, then, is to identify 
factors that cannot be observed based on variables that can be seen (Norusis).  What 
this means for this research is that factor analysis can determine whether the 27-items 
on the TAS:O measure the three constructs it purports to measure: affect, behavior, 
and cognition.  
Factor analysis can be further divided into confirmatory or exploratory facto 
analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  Exploratory factor analysis is typically used in 
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initial studies of instruments, because test constructors are usually interested in the 
structure of the tests (Tabachnick & Fidell).  Confirmatory factor analysis, on the 
other hand, is based on the premise that an a priori hypothesis exists (Tabachnick & 
Fidell).  For this study, because an a priori hypothesis exists, (namely that the TAS:O 
will describe affect, behavior, and cognition), confirmatory factor analysis was run on 
the data to determine whether or not a relationship existed among the responses o the 
TAS:O and the a priori hypothesis.   
A single assumption underlies both exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analysis: the measured variables are linearly related to the factors (Green et al., 2000).  
For this research, that specifically means that the responses on the TAS:O need to be 
linearly related to the three proposed factors of affect, behavior, and cognition.  This 
assumption is likely to be violated with instruments with very limited response scales 
(e.g., two point response scales or true-false items).  However, the 5-point scale of the 
TAS:O ensures that this assumption is not violated in the present study.   
Table 2 
 
Cross Tabulation of Hypothesized Scoring for the TAS:O 
Scenarios     
Mild 27 – 54    
Moderate  55 – 81   
Marked   82 – 108  
Severe    109 – 135
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Hypotheses 
1. The TAS:O will be a reliable instrument (i.e., results of this study will 
produce a Cronbach’s Alpha score of at least .70 or higher for the TAS:O, a 
Spearman-Brown coefficient of .70 or higher, and a positive correlation in 
regard to item total correlation). 
2. Data received from the administration of the TAS:O will indicate a 
discrimination among the three proposed factors (affect, behavior, cognition). 
3. The TAS:O will distinguish among mild, moderate, marked and severe crisis 
scenarios.    
4. There will be a statistically significant internal consistency (.70 or greater) 
among the predicted Cognitive subscale on the Triage Assessment Survey: 
Organizations. 
5. There will be a statistically significant correlation between the “affective” 
subscale scores on the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations and “affect” 
as a measured construct of the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations.   
6. There will be a statistically significant correlation between the “behavioral” 
subscale scores on the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations and 
“behavior” as a measured construct of the Triage Assessment Survey: 
Organizations.    
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Null Hypotheses 
1. There will be no statistically significant internal consistency (.70 or 
greater) among the overall questions on the Triage Assessment Survey: 
Organizations.   
2. There will be no statistically significant internal consistency (.70 or 
greater) among the predicted Affect subscale on the Triage Assessment 
Survey: Organizations.   
3. There will be no statistically significant internal consistency (.70 or 
greater) among the predicted Behavior subscale on the Triage Assessment 
Survey: Organizations.   
4. There will be no statistically significant correlation between the 
“cognitive” subscale scores on the Triage Assessment Survey: 
Organizations and “cognition” as a measured construct of the Triage 
Assessment Survey: Organizations. 
5. Factor analysis performed on the overall scores on the Triage Assessment 
Survey: Organizations will not match the three (affect, behavior, 
cognition) hypothesized constructs.    
Summary 
 This chapter described the methodology used in the present study.  
Specifically, reliability was discussed in terms of internal consistency (i.e., 
Cronbach’s alpha, Spearman-Brown formula, and item total correlation).  Validity 
was discussed through the use of confirmatory factor analysis. This chapter also 
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described participants, the instrument being used for the research, the research design, 
materials needed for the study, the procedure, data analysis, and hypotheses for this 
study.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
 This chapter describes the results of the data analyses.  The purpose of this 
research was to analyze the structure of the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations 
(TAS:O), developed by Myer (2002).  Specifically, construct validity of the TAS:O 
was evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis.  Reliability was tested using an 
internal consistency model.  In addition, this research analyzed the capacity of the 
TAS:O to distinguish among mild, moderate, marked and severe reactions of 
organizations to crises.  In this chapter, the results of the data analysis for this study 
will be described.   
In order to determine the reliability and validity for the TAS:O, several 
statistical analyses were done using SPSS 12.0.  Specifically, the reliability of the 
TAS:O was determined by running a Cronbach’s alpha, a Spearman-Brown formula, 
and an item total correlation procedure.  An ANOVA was run on the total score to 
determine whether or not a difference existed among scores that were responses to 
mild, moderate, marked and severe organizational crisis scenarios.  A MANOVA was 
run on the three hypothesized subscale scores.  Lastly, Factor Analysis was performed 
on the data to determine to what degree the three factors (affect, behavior, cognition) 
were represented by participants’ responses.   
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Statistics 
There will be no statistically significant internal consistency (.70 or greater) among 
the overall questions on the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations.   
The Cronbach’s alpha for the overall score on the 27-item TAS:O with 117 
participants providing 468 responses was .93.  A Spearman-Brown reliability test for 
the overall score on the TAS:O was .93, indicating that the TAS:O has very high 
split-half reliability.  As a result, this hypothesis is rejected.   
The Cronbach’s alpha on the 27 items after participants responded to a mild 
crisis scenario (117 responses) was .89.  The Cronbach’s alpha on the 27 items after 
participants responded to a moderate crisis scenario (117 responses) was .84.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha on the 27 items after participants responded to a marked crisis 
scenario (117 responses) was .81.  The Cronbach’s alpha on the 27 items after 
participants responded to a severe crisis scenario (117 responses) was .86.  The result 
of the overall Cronbach’s alpha is presented in Table 3.  The results of the Spearman-
Brown formula are presented in Table 4.   
Table 3 
Cronbach’s alpha for the Total Scores on the TAS:O 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
N of Items 
.926 27 
 
 
Table 4 
Spearman-Brown Formula for the Total Scores on the TAS:O 
Spearman-Brown 
Coefficient 
Equal Length .934
 Unequal Length .934
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An item total correlation revealed that 26 of the 27 items had significant correlations 
at the .001 level.  The range of the item total correlation was .277 – .787.  Only item 
20, “Routine decision making procedures have not been effective” was not 
significant.  The complete item-total correlation is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Item Total Correlation 
Item  Rxy Item Rxy 
1 .67** 16 .67** 
2 .63** 17 .63** 
3 .50** 18 .28** 
4 .68** 19 .40** 
5 .61** 20 -.05 
6 .67** 21 .74** 
7 .58** 22 .78** 
8 .59** 23 .68** 
9 .61** 24 .70** 
10 .50** 25 .77** 
11 .79** 26 .64** 
12 .61** 27 .61** 
13 .75**   
14 .71**   
15 .56**   
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2 tailed) 
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There will be a statistically significant internal consistency (.70 or greater) among 
the predicted Affective subscale on the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations.   
Items 1, 3, 5, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18, and 21 comprised the predicted Affective 
subscale.  A Cronbach’s alpha run on the predicted Affective subscale yielded a .79, 
which indicated a good reliability within the subscale.  As a result, the second 
hypothesis is accepted.   
 
There will be a statistically significant internal consistency (.70 or greater) among 
the predicted Behavior subscale on the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations.  
 Items 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 19, 22, 24, and 25 comprised the Behavior subscale.  The 
predicted Behavior subscale produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .88, indicating a high 
reliability within the subscale.  As a result, this hypothesis is accepted.    
 
There will be a statistically significant internal consistency (.70 or greater) among 
the predicted Cognitive subscale on the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations.   
Items 6, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, 23, 26, and 27 comprised the Cognitive subscale.  
The predicted Cognitive subscale produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .79, which 
indicates a good reliability within the subscale.  As a result, this hypothesis is 
accepted.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      52
 
 
The TAS:O will distinguish among mild, moderate, marked and severe crisis 
scenarios.      
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether or not a 
difference existed among the scores on the TAS:O in reaction to the mild, moderate, 
marked and severe organizational crisis scenarios.  The ANOVA (F (3, 467) = 
202.93, p<.001) indicated a statistically significant difference among the responses to 
the mild, moderate, marked and severe scenarios.  As a result, this hypothesis is 
accepted.   
Table 6 
Results of the One-way ANOVA 
Test Composite Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups  
85498.001 3    28499.334 202.928 .001 
Within Groups 65164.468 464        140.441   
Total 150662.47 467    
 
 The ANOVA determined that a significant difference existed among the four 
groups.  However, the ANOVA does not indicate specifically where those differences 
occur.  Thus, a post-hoc analysis was performed to determine exactly where the 
differences among the groups occurred.  A post-hoc analysis revealed that a 
statistically significant mean difference existed among all of the groups at the .001 
significance level.  The mean composite score on the TAS:O in response to the 
scenarios produced the following results: mild = 71.45, moderate = 90.5, marked = 
99.21, and severe = 107.95.  A Tukey HSD performed on the homogeneous subsets 
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resulted in a significance level of 1.00, indicating that no significant interactions 
existed among the four independent variables (i.e., mild, moderate, marked, and 
severe scenarios).  Tables 7 and 8 show the results of the post-hoc analysis. 
Table 7 
Post Hoc Test of Multiple Comparisons  
 
 
(l) Group   (J) Group 
Mean 
Difference 
(l – J) 
Std. Error Sig.  
Mild           Moderate 
                   Marked 
                   Severe 
-19.05896*
-27.76707*
-36.50175*
 1.54942 
 1.54942 
 1.54942 
.001
.001
.001  
Moderate   Mild 
                  Marked 
                  Severe 
19.05896* 
- 8.70811* 
-17.44279*
1.54942 
 1.54942 
 1.54942 
.001
.001
.001  
Marked      Mild 
                  Moderate 
                  Severe   
27.76707* 
 8.70811* 
-8.73468* 
1.54942 
 1.54942 
 1.54942 
.001
.001
.001  
Severe        Mild 
                   Moderate 
                   Marked 
36.50175* 
17.44279* 
 8.73468* 
1.54942 
 1.54942 
 1.54942 
.001
.001
.001  
 
Table 8 
Tukey’s HSD on the Homogenous Subsets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group N Mild   Moderate Marked Severe 
Mild 
Moderate 
Marked  
Severe 
Sig. 
117 
117 
117 
117 
71.4451 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
90.5040 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
99.2122
 
1.00 
 
 
 
107.9468
1.00 
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Data received from the administration of the TAS:O will indicate a discrimination 
among the three proposed factors (affect, behavior, cognition). 
  The dimensionality of the 27 items from the TAS:O was measured using 
confirmatory factor analysis.  Three criteria were used to determine the number of 
factors to rotate: the a priori hypothesis that the measure would produce 3 factors, the 
Scree test, and the interpretability of the factor solution.  The a priori hypothesis was 
that data received from the administration of the TAS:O would discriminate among 
the constructs of affect, behavior, and cognition (i.e., three factors).  Results of the 
Scree test demonstrated that the data would fall into three factors.  The Scree plot is 
shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 1: The scree plot above demonstrates that the data can best be interpreted by 
a three factor solution. 
Since the a priori hypothesis and Scree plot both indicated that the data would 
produce a three-factor solution, the last step of the factor analysis was to interpret the 
rotated factor solution.  Initially, with eigenvalues set at 1, a four-factor solution 
emerged from the data.  However, only item 20 loaded onto the fourth factor.  Item 
20 was also the only item on the item-total correlation that yielded a non-significant 
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correlation.  Therefore, for experimental purposes, item 20 was removed from the 
solution.  Three factors were then extracted using a principal axis factoring analysis 
with a Varimax rotation.    
 Since the goal of this research was to test the TAS:O as it was, item 20 was 
reintegrated with the data.  Using the criteria for the confirmatory factor analysis 
described above, the solution was forced into three factors to extract the final factors. 
Again, principal axis factoring analysis with a Varimax rotation was used to 
determine the factor solution.  Factor loadings are the correlation between the items 
and the newly created factor (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  For this study, a minimum 
factor loading of .5 was required for an item to be interpreted as part of a factor.  With 
a factor loading of .5 or greater, 8 items loaded onto factor 1 (items 4, 6, 10, 12, 16, 
19, 21, 23), 7 items loaded onto factor 2 (items 3, 5, 13, 14, 15, 17, 24), and 6 items 
loaded onto factor 3 (items 1, 2, 9, 11, 25, 27).  Six items (7, 8, 18, 20, 22 and 26) did 
not load at the .5 level onto any factor.  The rotated solution, as shown in Table 9, 
yielded the hypothesized three factors.   
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Table 9 
 
Rotated Factor Matrix 
  1 2 3 
Item 1 .24 .43 .50
Item 2 .47   .10 .51
Item 3 .17 .55 .13 
Item 4 .70            .10  .31 
Item 5          .15   .58 .35 
Item 6 .52  .42 .15 
Item 7 .34  .27 .38 
Item 8 .38  .40 .18 
Item 9 .09  .36 .62
Item10 .60  .04 .12 
Item 11 .46  .30 .61
Item 12 .70  .06 .21 
Item 13 .31 .66 .35 
Item 14 .34 .60 .30 
Item 15           .07  .70 .23 
Item 16 .55            .41  .16 
Item 17 .15 .50 .45
Item 18           .03  .45 -.15 
Item 19 .56  .08 -.10 
Item 20 .03         - .10  -.16 
Item 21 .52  .48 .27 
Item 22 .48  .44 .43 
Item 23 .62  .34 .14 
Item 24           .39 .57 .26 
Item 25 .45  .34 .54
Item 26 .46  .27 .34 
Item 27 .24  .24 .58
 
 Once the factors were established, further reliability analysis was performed.  
On the 8 items that loaded onto factor 1 (items 4, 6, 10, 12, 16, 19, 21, and 23), the 
Cronbach’s alpha was .86.  On the 7 items that loaded onto factor 2 (items 3, 5, 13, 
14, 15, 17, and 24), the Cronbach’s alpha was .87.  Finally, of the 6 items that loaded 
onto factor 3 (items 1, 2, 9, 11, 25, and 27), the Cronbach’s alpha was .86.  Thus, all 
three empirical factors appear to have relatively high reliability.   
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 Three predicted subscales existed (affect, behavior, and cognition).  A 
MANOVA was performed on the data to determine the effect of the organizational 
crisis scenarios on the three dependent variables (i.e., the predicted Affect subscale, 
predicted Behavior subscale, and the predicted Cognitive subscale).  A MANOVA 
examines the hypothesis that the population means for the dependent variables (in this 
case, the affect, behavior, and cognitive subscales) are the same across the groups 
(Green, Salkino, & Akey, 2000).  An assumption of a MANOVA is that if the 
population means are equal for all groups, then the population means for any linear 
combination of these dependent variables is also equal for all groups (Green et al., 
2000).  The MANOVA revealed that statistically significant differences were found 
among the four organizational crisis scenarios on the three predicted subscales, 
Wilks’ Λ .24, F(9, 1124.54) = 100.58, p<.001.  In other words, the MANOVA 
revealed that a statistically significant difference existed among the Affect subscale 
mean, Behavior subscale mean, and Cognitive subscale mean, and any linear 
combination of these means.   
 
There will be no statistically significant correlation (.70 or greater) between the 
Affective subscale scores on the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations and 
“affect” as a measured construct of the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations.   
Factor analysis performed using principal axis factoring and a Varimax 
rotation yielded three factors.  Fifty-six percent (5 of the 9 predicted items) of factor 2 
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aligned with the predicted Affect subscale.  As a result, this hypothesis is accepted.  
  
There will be no statistically significant correlation (.70 or greater) between the 
Behavioral subscale scores on the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations and 
“behavior” as a measured construct of the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations.  
Thirty-three percent (3 or the 9 predicted items) of factor 3 accounted for the 
predicted Behavior construct.  As a result, this hypothesis is accepted.   
 
There will be no statistically significant correlation ( .70 or greater) between the 
Cognitive subscale scores on the Triage Assessment Survey: Organizations and 
“cognition” as a measured construct of the Triage Assessment Survey: 
Organizations.  
Fifty-six percent (5 or the 9 predicted items) of factor 1 accounted for the 
predicted cognitive construct.  As a result, this hypothesis is accepted.      
A final statistical conundrum existed for the present study.  All 117 
participants responded to the four levels of independent variable (i.e., the four 
organizational crisis scenarios).  When the means that are examined derive from the 
same participants measured under different conditions, further statistical analyses are 
needed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  In these designs, the between subjects design is 
equal to the sums of squares and mean square for the effect of the independent 
variable; however, the error term is further divided into individual differences due to 
participants, and interaction of individual differences due to treatment (Tabachnick & 
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Fidell).  Thus, in the design of the present study, the between subjects design is equal 
to the sums of squares and mean square for the effect of the four different 
organizational crisis scenarios, and the interest lies in determining whether or not the 
differences occurred due to the same participants reacting to different levels of 
organizational crisis scenarios, or because of the organizational crisis scenarios 
themselves. 
 A one-way ANOVA was run on the person variable and composite score.  The 
group variable produced a mean square of 28499.33.  The person variable produced a 
mean square of 115.95.  Using hand calculations to divide the group variable by the 
interaction mean squared (or person variable), an F score of 245.78 was found.  This 
statistically significant F score demonstrated that the person variable had no 
significant effect on the dependent variable.  In other words, despite the fact that the 
same participants responded to different levels of the independent variable (i.e., the 
four organizational crisis scenarios), the repeated measures design did not have a 
statistically significant effect on the dependent variable.   
Summary 
 This chapter described the results of the present study.  Specifically, the 
overall Cronbach’s alpha was .93, the Spearman-Brown correlation was .93, and the 
item total correlation revealed all items except item 20 were positively and 
significantly correlated, all of which appear to describe the TAS:O an apparently 
highly reliable instrument.  As the a priori hypothesis predicted, factor analysis 
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produced three distinct factors.  Lastly, an ANOVA revealed that the TAS:O was able 
to distinguish among mild, moderate, marked, and severe scenarios.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of Major Findings 
 This study investigated the reliability and validity of the Triage Assessment 
Survey: Organizations (TAS:O), a 27-item instrument designed to measure the 
reactions of organizations to crises.  Specifically, construct validity of the TAS:O was 
evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis.  Reliability was tested using an internal 
consistency model.  In addition, this research analyzed the capacity of the TAS:O to 
distinguish among mild, moderate, marked and severe reactions of organizations to 
crises.  In this chapter, a summary of the study, discussion of the results, and further 
recommendations will be described.    
Summary of the Study 
 From the onset, the goal of this research was to determine whether the TAS:O 
was a reliable and valid instrument.  Reliability was tested with an internal 
consistency model.  The Cronbach’s alpha and Spearman-Brown tests both were .93, 
indicating a very high internal consistency.  Validity was tested using confirmatory 
factor analysis.  The factor analysis yielded the three predicted factors that the a priori 
hypothesis suggested.  An ANOVA demonstrated that the TAS:O has the capacity to 
distinguish among mild, moderate, marked, and severe reactions of organizations to 
crises.  Furthermore, post hoc analyses revealed that no statistically significant 
interactions existed among the scores in response to the mild, moderate, marked, and 
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severe organizational crisis scenarios.  Thus, while this was only the first statistical 
test performed on the TAS:O, the findings indicated that the TAS:O is a reliable and 
valid instrument of organizational reactions to crises.   
Discussion 
 The model on which the TAS:O was constructed (i.e., the Triage Assessment 
Model) provided the rationale for predicting that factor analysis would yield three 
distinct factors.  Results of the principal axis analysis provided support for the 
existence of three distinct factors (affect, behavior, and cognition).  Specifically, with 
.5 used as a cutoff level for factor loadings, 56% of factor 2 accounted for the 
proposed Affect subscale.  Likewise, 56% of factor 1 accounted for the proposed 
Cognitive subscale.  While factor analysis yielded a distinct third factor, only 33% of 
factor 3 accounted for the proposed Behavior subscale.  Six items did not load onto 
any factor at the .5 level.  The three factors that were found accounted for an 
impressive 51% of the variance.   
 Factor 2 provided the items that most closely loaded on the predicted Affect 
subscale (items 3, 5, 13, 14, 15, 17, and 24).  Recall that items 1, 3, 5, 9, 13, 15, 17, 
18, and 21 comprised the predicted Affect subscale.  Item 1, “Motivation to work has 
remained steady,” item 9, “Absenteeism has become more commonplace,” item 14, 
“Confidence in leadership to make good decisions is diminished,” item 18, “Gossip 
has remained steady,” and item 21, “More people than usual are talking about finding 
a new position,” did not load onto the Affect subscale as hypothesized.   
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 Interestingly, item 3, “Rumors are more widespread,” loaded onto the 
predicted Affect subscale, while item 18, “Gossip has remained steady,” and item 21, 
“More people than usual are talking about finding a new position,” did not load onto 
the Affect subscale.  A possible reason for this could be that in item 3 the actual word 
rumors was included, while in items 18 and 21, the concept of rumors could only be 
inferred.  Perhaps the word rumors has a strong affective affiliation, as rumors tend to 
be associated with harm.   
 Item 1, “Motivation to work has remained steady,” and item 9, “Absenteeism 
has become more commonplace,” appear to be similar items.  Both items loaded on 
factor 3, which most closely aligns with the predicted Behavior subscale.  An 
argument can be made that without motivation to work, absenteeism is likely to rise.  
Absenteeism is an observable event, and can thus fit in the Behavior subscale.   
 Item 14, “Confidence in leadership to make good decisions is diminished,” 
which loaded on Factor 2, also does not align with the predicted Affect subscale.  
This is the only item that uses the term confidence directly.  A possible rationale for 
this item falling under factor 2 with the other predicted Affect questions is that 
confidence can be used to describe an emotional state.  
 Factor 1 provided the items that most closely aligned with the predicted 
Cognitive subscale (items 4, 6, 10, 12, 16, 19, 21, and 23).  Recall that items 6, 10, 
12, 14, 16, 20, 23, 26, and 27 comprised the predicted Cognitive subscale.  Item 14, 
“Confidence in leadership to make good decisions is diminished,” item 20, “Routine 
decision making procedures have not been effective,” item 26, “Organizational goals 
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are secure,” and item 27, “People have to do other people’s jobs,” all did not load on 
the predicted Cognitive subscale as hypothesized. 
 In hindsight, item 27, “People have to do other people’s jobs,” appears to be a 
behavioral item.  Support for this rationale can be found in that this item loaded onto 
factor 3, which most closely aligned with the predicted Behavior subscale.   
  As discussed previously, item 14, “Confidence in leadership to make good 
decisions is diminished,” aligned with the Affect subscale.  
 Item 20, “Routine decision making procedures have not been effective,” can 
be discussed separately.  Item 20 is the only item on the inter-item total correlation 
that did not produce a significant correlation.  Furthermore, when an initial 
exploratory factor analysis was performed, a four-factor solution was found.  
However, the only item that loaded onto the fourth factor was item 20.  Thus, the 
decision was made to force the data into a three-factor solution.  Between the inter-
item total correlation and the response from the exploratory factor analysis, it appears 
that item 20 is not an effective measure of anything the test is attempting to 
determine.  When item 20 was thrown out of the data set, three factors were found 
even using eigenvalues over 1.    
 Item 26, “Organizational goals are secure,” was the final item that did not load 
on the predicted Cognitive subscale.  Item 10, “Organizational goals have altered,” 
did load with the predicted Cognitive subscale, so it was surprising that item 26 did 
not also load on the predicted Cognitive subscale.  However, a closer examination 
reveals that, while item 26 did not load with the predicted Cognitive subscale at the .5 
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level, the factor loading was .46 on factor 1, which, while it was below the cutoff 
score for this study, does indicate a tendency for this item to align with the predicted 
Cognitive subscale.   
 Factor 3 provided the items that most closely aligned with the Behavior 
subscale.  Items 1, 2, 9, 11, 25, and 27 loaded at the .5 level on Factor 3.  Recall that 
items 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 19, 22, 24, and 25 comprised the predicted Behavior subscale.  Of 
the three factors found, only 33% of the factors found aligned with the predicted 
Behavior subscale.  Item 1, “Motivation to work has remained steady,” item 4, 
“Standard operating procedures have been suspended,” item 7, “Agendas for 
meetings are constructive,” item 8, “Interaction with others is unchanged,” item 19, 
“Meeting agendas are unchanged,” item 22, “Day-to-day business has been 
disrupted,” and item 24, “People are more distracted than usual,” all did not load at 
the .5 level on the Behavior subscale as hypothesized.   
 As discussed previously, item 1, “Motivation to work has remained steady,” 
appears to make sense to load on the Behavior subscale, because motivation can be 
measured in terms of objective phenomena.   
 Item 4, “Standard operating procedures have been suspended,” did not load on 
the Behavior subscale.  It is possible that this item was more accurately viewed as a 
command, and thus, a cognitive direction. 
 Items 7, “Agendas for meetings are constructive,” and item 8, “Interaction 
with others is unchanged,” do not load onto any factor at the .5 level.  Both items 
appear to be behavioral constructs, but the results of the data do not support these 
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items loading onto the Behavior subscale.  It should be noted that if item 20 is thrown 
out of the data set, item 7 then loads onto the Behavioral subscale, and item 8 still 
does not load onto any factor at the .5 level.   
 Finally, item 22, “Day-to-day business has been disrupted,” was hypothesized 
to load on the Behavior subscale, but did not load on any factor at the .5 level.  In 
fact, the factor loadings for item 22 were, factor 1: .48, factor 2: .44, and factor 3: .43, 
indicating that at best, with a lower factor loading, item 22 would cross load on all 
three factors. 
 To conclude the discussion on the factor analysis, it should be noted that the 
TAS:O appears to have the capacity to discriminate among the three constructs of 
affect, behavior, and cognition.  While factor analysis revealed that three distinct 
factors exist, it did not confirm a perfect match to the hypothesized ideas of what 
constitutes affective, behavioral and cognitive organizational responses to crises.  
Instead, a total of 48% of the predicted items loaded as hypothesized.  Twenty-two 
percent of the total items did not load onto any factor, and the remaining 40% of the 
items did not load as predicted.  Perhaps new considerations should be made with this 
last 40%.  In fact, a review of the items that did not load as predicted, found that the 
questions appeared to be worded in ways that align with the concept of affect, 
behavior and cognition, and could thus be reinterpreted from the factors under which 
they fell.  In other words, factor analysis produced three factors.  While 40% of these 
items did not load onto the predicted factors, the factors produced from the statistical 
analyses could still be called Affect, Behavior, and Cognition.    
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 The results of the reliability tests appear to indicate that the TAS:O is a highly 
reliable instrument.  The overall Cronbach’s alpha was .93, which is an indicator of 
remarkably high reliability.  Impressively, a Spearman-Brown split-half reliability 
test also produced a reliability coefficient of .93.  The item-total correlation likewise 
verified the reliability of the TAS:O, and demonstrated that 26 of the 27 items yielded 
positive correlations, with a range of .277 - .787.   
 For this study, participants filled out the TAS:O after responding to four 
organizational crisis scenarios.  Each scenario was designed to be perceived as a 
progressively more intense organizational crisis.  The four scenarios represented a 
mild crisis, a moderate crisis, a marked crisis, and a severe crisis.  However, 
participants did not respond to these scenarios in any particular order.  Instead, a 
counterbalance precaution was taken by having the order of the scenarios randomly 
assigned to the participants.  Considering participants were given scenarios in a 
random order, it seemed impressive that such a clear distinction existed among the 
four groups.   
 The goal of providing scenarios for the participants to respond to was two-
fold.  First, it would have been unethical to ask people suffering from crises to 
respond to research.  Second, by having participants respond to hypothetical 
situations, a spectrum of organizational crisis intensity was researched, thus providing 
information as to whether the TAS:O can discriminate among mild, moderate, 
marked and severe crises.  Nonetheless, this method led to the limitation that the 
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concocted organizational crises could not have elicited the same level of experience 
as actual organizational crises.    
 The ANOVA run on the data indicated that a significant difference existed for 
the main effects.  In other words, statistical analyses determined that the TAS:O was 
able to distinguish among mild, moderate, marked and severe organizational crises.  
More impressively, while the data indicated that a significant difference existed 
among the different levels of organizational crises, it was also found that no 
interactions existed among the responses to the mild, moderate, marked and severe 
scenarios.  The statistical analyses from this research thus indicated that the TAS:O 
can provide information as to what aspect of the organization was most significantly 
effected (affect, behavior, or cognition), and also to what degree the crisis has 
effected the organization (i.e., mild, moderate, marked, or severe crises). 
Scoring the TAS:O 
 Work still needs to be done in regard to scoring the TAS:O.  Initially, the 
author of the TAS:O used an arbitrary classification based on a cross tabulation.  In 
other words, he believed that mild scores would fall between 27-54, moderate scores 
would fall between  54-81, marked scores would fall between 81-108, and severe 
scores would fall between 108-135.  However, the data revealed that responses to the 
mild scenario ranged from 31-119, responses to the moderate scenario ranged from 
62-122, responses to the marked scenario ranged from 66-127, and responses to the 
severe scenario ranged from 44-133.  It appears that outliers may have influenced the 
range for these scores.   
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 To calculate a reasonable scoring range by which the intensity of the crisis 
would be able to be determined, the mean scores for each group were found.  Then, 
by adding and subtracting the standard deviation from the mean, a range was 
determined.  The actual scoring range for the TAS:O has some overlap.  Responses to 
mild crisis scenarios would fall between 58-84, responses to moderate crisis scenarios 
would fall between 80-100, responses to marked crisis scenarios would fall between 
99-109, and responses to severe crisis scenarios would fall between 96-120.  Since 
overlap on the scoring range does not provide clear information in regard to the level 
of crisis an organization is experiencing, it is recommended that the test be scored 
with the idea that only three levels of crises exist, mild, moderate and severe.  Thus, 
the scoring range should be that responses less than 80 indicate a mild organizational 
crisis, responses ranging from 81 – 99 indicate a moderate organizational crisis, and 
responses above 101 indicate severe organizational crisis.  An illustration of the 
actual scoring range compared with the suggested scoring range is provided in Table 
10. 
Table 10 
Scoring Range 
Actual Scoring Suggested Scoring 
Mild           54 – 84 
Moderate    80 – 100 
Marked       99 - 109 
Severe        96 – 120 
Mild         = < 80 
Moderate = 81 – 99 
Severe      = 100 + 
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Implications of the Study 
 Though this study was only an initial evaluation of the TAS:O, statistical 
analyses appear to indicate that the TAS:O is a reliable and valid measure of how 
organizations respond to crises.  Considering Lewis and Roberts (2001) noted the 
need for crisis assessment instruments with strong psychometrics, the results of this 
study appear to demonstrate that the TAS:O may have been developed at an 
opportune time.  A reliable and valid brief organizational crisis assessment instrument 
is advantageous to both organizations and consultants.  The TAS:O is especially 
advantageous in that it not only appears psychometrically sound, but it also accounts 
for the human impact of crises by assessing which construct (affect, behavior, or 
cognition) of the human beings comprising the organization is most significantly 
effected.   
 The relevance of the TAS:O being a sound psychometrical organizational 
crisis assessment instrument is that organizations that use the TAS:O to assess a crisis 
will have an opportunity to understand more clearly exactly how the organization is 
being effected.  The impact is far reaching in that potentially countless people will 
have the opportunity to have their impending crisis identified.  Consultants could use 
the identified information from the TAS:O to facilitate organizations’ addressing 
areas (affect, behavior, cognition) that are deficient at some level.             
Recommendations for Further Study 
 It was the TAS:O author’s intention to have the instrument describe 
organizations’ affective, behavioral and cognitive responses to crises.  Statistical 
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analyses provided support for the TAS:O having the capacity to do exactly that.  The 
TAS:O can clearly differentiate among three distinct factors, and those factors could 
reasonably be labeled Affect, Behavior, and Cognition.  However, further 
modification of the instrument is necessary to categorize what items fall under Affect, 
Behavior, and Cognition.   
 The TAS:O appears to be a highly reliable instrument for measuring some 
effects of organizational crises.  Though the reliability for this instrument is 
extremely high, further revision of the test can be performed to augment the 
reliability.  For example, item number 20 is suspect, and should be thrown out or 
modified.  A recommendation for revising item 20, “Routine decision making 
procedures have not been effective,” is to make the sentence more active; e.g., 
“Routine decision making procedures are no longer effective.” Also, items 7, 8, 18, 
20, 22, and 26 did not load at the .5 level on any factor.  Thus, a recommendation for 
augmenting reliability of the TAS:O would involve looking at these items for 
modification.   
 Statistical analyses revealed that the TAS:O appeared to be able to 
discriminate among different types of crises.  In fact, by evaluating a person variable, 
a MANOVA indicated that the interaction among groups was not due to repeated 
measures.  However, because 117 participants responded to the same survey four 
times, future research should involve ANOVA testing of the TAS:O in regard to 
different levels of crises with different participants exposed to the different treatment 
groups, rather than all the participants being exposed to all the groups.  Furthermore, 
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the TAS:O should be tested with an organization that is not experiencing a crisis, so a 
baseline can be established. 
 Finally, this research demonstrated that the TAS:O appears to be a reliable 
and valid instrument in an experimental setting.  Thus, perhaps the most significant 
recommendation is to have the TAS:O tested in a real situation.  It would not have 
been ethical to do preliminary research on the TAS:O using participants experiencing 
actual crises.  However, now that initial testing has provided results indicating an 
apparent strength in the TAS:O, it would be important to evaluate the TAS:O in a 
field setting.    
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
TITLE:  Examination of the Reliability and Validity of the Triage 
Assessment Survey: Organizations 
 
INVESTIGATOR: Christian Conte 
 1429 Jefferson Heights Road 
 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15235 
 (412) 352-7941 
 
ADVISOR: Rick A. Myer, Ph.D. 
 Counselor Education Department 
 (412) 396-4036 
 
SOURCE OF SUPPORT: This study is being performed as partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Ed.D. degree in Counselor Education 
and Supervision at Duquesne University.   
 
PURPOSE: You are being asked to participate in a research project that 
seeks to investigate individual perceptions of organizations 
in crisis.  You will be asked to read a scenario about an 
organization in crisis, and then fill out a 27-item survey.   
 
RISKS AND BENEFITS: There are no risks or benefits to participants in this study. 
 
COMPENSATION: You will not receive any compensation for participation in 
this research. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: Your name will never appear on any survey or research 
instruments.  No identity will be made in the data analysis.  
All written materials and consent forms will be stored in a 
locked file in the researcher’s home.  Your responses will 
only appear in statistical data summaries.  All materials will 
be destroyed within 5 years of this research.   
 
RIGHT TO WITHDRAW: You are under no obligation to participate in this study.  
You are free to withdraw your consent to participate at any 
time.   
 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS:  A summary of the results of this research will be supplied 
to you, at no cost, upon request.   
VOLUNTARY CONSENT: I have read the above statements and understand what is 
being requested of me.  I also understand that my 
participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my 
consent at any time, for any reason.  On these terms, I 
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certify that I am willing to participate in this research 
project. 
 
 I understand that should I have any further questions about 
my participation in this study, I may call Dr. Paul Richer, 
Chair of the Duquesne University Institutional Review 
Board (412-396-6326). 
 
 
 
_________________________________                              ______________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date 
 
 
___________________________________   _______________________ 
Participant’s Signature     Date  
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Mild Crisis Scenario 
 A week ago your company underwent its first audit.  Several key pieces of paper 
were not where they were supposed to be.  Hence, your organization was given a warning 
to straighten out its paper trail.  Concerns have been expressed among the managers, and 
some employees began to wonder who misplaced what, and what was going to be done 
about it. Your coworkers’ moods, while affected, have remained relatively stable.  
However, while no one appeared to believe that this incident was an inherent fault of the 
foundation of the organization, some people seemed to be troubled with where they 
believe the organization is headed.  
 Some initial small group meetings distributed information throughout the 
organization about the audit, and all and all, there were no major disruptions of the 
normal routine.  In fact, consumers have appeared to be unaware of this slight disturbance 
to the company.  Management provided incentives for employees to work toward positive 
solutions to the current task.  Control of the organization remained stable, and the 
decision-makers continued to function normally.  Though the typical organizational goals 
have been altered somewhat, productivity has remained the same.    
 
Moderate Crisis Scenario 
 Ten days ago a fire broke out in your organization.  Some damage was done to the 
payroll office, and subsequently, several sub-groups of employees in the organization did 
not get paid on time.  As if this wasn’t enough, the fire happened less than two weeks 
after a bomb threat, and hence, a constant “buzz” went around the organization about 
possible connections.  In fact, some people became frustrated that more was not being 
done to clarify exactly what was going on.  Not only have people begun to surmise, 
“How safe is this organization,” but also, people seem to be wondering if they are in for a 
financial crisis.  At least one person has been heard asking, “Is the company going belly 
up?” 
 While several people have been contributing negative attitudes toward the 
situation, others have become frustrated with the negativity in general.  Though 
management seems to be confident that production will remain relatively stable, an 
interoffice memo indicates that meetings appear to be necessary to quell the apparent 
“buzz” in the organization.     
    
Marked Crisis Scenario 
 Your organization moved into its present workspace one year ago.  The building, 
relatively new, had not previously been occupied.  Within, the building had all the 
trappings of new offices, and the accouterments all seemed normal.   
 At the onset no one took note of the mild coughs and aches that several 
employees experienced.  Then absenteeism proliferated, with some employees missing 
work on a noticeable basis because of chronic illness.   
 Over the last two weeks, people began to say that the “sick building” caused the 
illnesses.  From the custodial staff through the secretaries the talk spread into the middle 
echelons of the organization.  Ten days ago, a grievance was filed to seek management’s 
intervention in what is perceived as a health crisis with three out of every ten employees 
missing at least four workdays per month.   
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 Accompanying the absenteeism is an excess work burden on those reporting for 
work, and the company is beginning to fall short of achieving some of its business goals.  
At times workers have been heard to ask, “Why isn’t management doing something about 
the conditions around here?”  In at least one incident, a secretary blurted to her boss, “We 
could all be dying, but no one would care.”     
 
Severe Crisis Scenario 
 Less than a week ago your organization was hit by a hurricane that destroyed the 
main infrastructure to the point where the building had to be declared condemned.  Two 
custodial workers were severely injured and one was killed by the tempest.  Productivity 
for the organization has virtually stopped.  Because little has been able to be salvaged, 
people are in a panic about what jobs might “not be needed” when business resumes.  
Talk has already begun about your organization possibly having to move its main 
building 45 minutes south of its current location.        
 The management has had to have several meetings to discuss the immediate 
future of the organization.  To make matters worse, the CEO is on a two-week sailing 
vacation, and has still not been in contact with anyone from the organization.  Without 
the usual leader in charge, management has divided into factions and remains in 
opposition about what steps to take first.  Many of the employees doubt that a “real 
recovery” can be made, and many of them hustle to look for new jobs.  The employees 
that don’t or “can’t” leave have begun to align themselves with the different managerial 
factions.      
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Demographic Information 
 
 
1. AGE ___________ 
 
 
2. GENDER (Circle): Male  Female 
 
 
3. YEARS OF PROFESSIONAL WORK EXPERIENCE _____________ 
 
 
4. CURRENT WORK SETTING (Check appropriate box/boxes): 
 
[ ] NON-PROFIT 
[ ] FOR PROFIT 
[ ] HUMAN SERVICES (Mental health, social work, etc.)  
[ ] MANUFACTURING FIRM (Automobile producers, computer producers, etc.) 
[ ] MERCHANTISER (Retailers or wholesalers) 
[ ] SERVICE ENTERPRISE (Repair stores, restaurants, hospitals, hotels, etc.)  
    
 
5. ACADEMIC DEGREES (Check highest degree earned): 
 
[ ] HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA 
[ ] BACHELOR’S DEGREE 
[ ] MASTER’S DEGREE 
[ ] DOCTORAL DEGREE 
 
6. ETHNIC BACKGROUND (Check appropriate box): 
 
[ ] BLACK – Afro-American or African origin 
[ ] ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLANDER – Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Indian origin 
[ ] HISPANIC – Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American origin 
[ ] WHITE (Not Hispanic) – European, North African or Middle Eastern origin 
[ ] AMERICAN INDIAN OR ALASKAN NATIVE  
 
7. U.S. CITIZEN (Circle):  Yes  No 
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Pilot Study 
 
 A pilot study was conducted before the main study was performed.  The study 
consisted of 25 graduate students who were enrolled in a crisis intervention course.  Each 
participant was given all four crisis scenarios (mild, moderate, marked and severe) in 
random order.  After reading each scenario, they responded to the TAS:O, so that each 
participant produced scores for four TAS:O forms.   
 Statistical analysis was performed on the data.  A Cronbach’s Alpha reliability 
test yielded a score of .95, which appeared to indicate that the TAS:O is highly reliable.  
Using the extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring and a Varimax rotation with 
Kaiser Normalization in SPSS, factor analysis revealed 3 factors.  The first factor 
matched 4 of the 9 hypothesized items for the behavioral subscale, and accounted for 8 
items.  The second factor matched 6 of the 9 hypothesized items for the cognitive 
subscale, and accounted for 6 items.  The third factor matched 8 of the 9 hypothesized 
items for the affective subscale, and accounted for 13 items.  Thus, the results of the 
factor analysis indicated that the three factors could be renamed.  However, because only 
25 participants were used, yielding 100 responses, enough significant data was not 
established to effectively run factor analysis.       
   
 
 
 
